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ABSTRACT
When a long-term energy constraint is imposed to a transmitter, the
average energy-efficiency of a transmitter is, in general, not max-
imized by always transmitting. In a cognitive radio context, this
means that a secondary link can re-exploit the non-used time-slots.
In the case where the secondary link is imposed to generate no in-
terference on the primary link, a relevant issue is therefore to know
the fraction of time-slots available to the secondary transmitter, de-
pending on the system parameters. On the other hand, if the sec-
ondary transmitter is modeled as a selfish and free player choosing
its power control policy to maximize its average energy-efficiency,
resulting primary and secondary signals are not necessarily orthog-
onal and studying the corresponding Stackelberg game is relevant
to know the outcome of this interactive situation in terms of power
control policies.
Index Terms— Cognitive radio, Energy-efficiency, Power con-
trol, Primary user, Secondary user, Stackelberg games.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the ideas of cognitive radio is to allow some wireless termi-
nals, especially transmitters, to sense their environment in terms of
used spectrum and to react to it dynamically. The cognitive radio
paradigm [1] has become more and more important to the wireless
community since the release of the FCC report [2]. Indeed, cogni-
tive radio corresponds to a good way of tackling the crucial prob-
lem of spectrum congestion and increasing spectral efficiency. More
recently, the main actors of the telecoms industry, namely carriers,
manufacturers, and regulators have also realized the importance of
energy aspects in wireless networks (see e.g., [3]) both at the net-
work infrastructure and mobile terminal sides. There are many rea-
sons for this and we will not provide them here. As far as this paper
is concerned, the goal is to study the influence of long-term energy
constraints (e.g., the limited battery life typically) on power control
in networks where cognitive radios are involved. The performance
criterion which is considered for the terminal is derived from the
one introduced by Goodman and Mandayam in [4]. Therein, the au-
thors propose a distributed power control scheme for frequency non-
selective block fading multiple access channels. For each block, a
terminal aims at maximizing its individual energy-efficiency namely,
the number of successfully decoded bits at the receiver per Joule
consumed at the transmitter. Although, a power control maximizing
such a performance metric is called energy-efficient, it does not take
into account possible long-term energy constraints. Indeed, in [4]
and related references (e.g., [5][6]), the terminals always transmit,
which amounts to considering no constraints on the available (aver-
age) energy. The goal of the present work is precisely to see how
energy constraints modify power control policies in a single-user
channel and in a cognitive radio channel. For the sake of simplic-
ity, time-slotted communications are assumed.
The paper is organized in two main parts. In Sec. 3 a single-
user channel is considered. It is shown that maximizing an average
energy-efficiency under a long-term energy constraint leads the ter-
minal to not transmit on certain blocks. The probability that the
terminal does not transmit is lower bounded. In a setting where a
primary transmitter has to control its power under energy-constraint,
this probability matters since it corresponds to the fraction of avail-
able time-slots which are re-exploitable by a secondary (cognitive)
transmitter. In Sec. 3, the single-user channel model is sufficient
since the secondary link has to meet a zero interference constraint (it
can only exploit non-used time-slots). In Sec. 4, the secondary trans-
mitter is assumed to be free to use all the time-slots. The technical
difference between the primary and secondary transmitters is that the
former has to choose its power level in the first place while the latter
observes this level and react to it. The suited interaction model is
therefore a Stackelberg game [7] where the primary and secondary
transmitters are respectively the leader and follower of the game.
Sec. 5 provides numerical results which allow us to validate some
derived results and compare the two cognitive settings (depending
whether the secondary transmitter can generate non-orthogonal sig-
nals).
2. GENERAL SYSTEM MODEL
In the whole paper the goal is to study a system comprising two
transmitter-receiver pairs. The signal model under consideration can
be described by a frequency non-selective block fading channel. The
signals received by the two receivers write as:
y1 = h11x1 + h21x2 + z1
y2 = h22x2 + h12x1 + z2
. (1)
The channel gain of the link ij namely, hij is assumed to be con-
stant over each block or time-slot. The quantity gij = |hij |2 is
assumed to be a continuous random variable having independent re-
alizations and distributed according to the probability density func-
tion φij(gij). The reception noises are zero-mean complex white
Gaussian noises with variance σ2. The instantaneous power of the
transmitted signal xi on time-slot t is given by
pi(t) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
|x(n)|2 (2)
where n is the symbol index and N the number of symbols per time-
slot. For simplicity, transmissions are assumed to be time-slotted.
Transmitter 1 (resp. 2), receiver 1 (resp. 2), link 11 (resp. 22)
will be respectively called primary (resp. secondary) transmitter,
primary (resp. secondary) receiver, and (resp. secondary) primary
link. The main technical difference between the primary and the sec-
ondary links is that the secondary transmitter can observe the power
levels chosen by the primary transmitter but the converse does not
hold. In this paper, two scenarios are investigated:
• Scenario 1 (Sec. 3): the secondary transmitter is imposed to
meet a zero-interference constraint on the primary link. Since
the primary and secondary signals are orthogonal, everything
happens for the transmitter 1 as if it was transmitting over a
single-user channel.
• Scenario 2 (Sec. 4): this time, the secondary transmitter can
use all the time-slots and not only those not exploited by the
primary link. Primary and secondary signals are therefore
not orthogonal in general. In this framework, for each time-
slot, the primary transmitter chooses its power level and is
informed that the secondary will observe and react to it in a
rational manner. A Stackelberg game formulation is proposed
to study this interactive situation.
3. WHEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SIGNALS ARE
ORTHOGONAL
3.1. Optimal power control scheme for the primary transmitter
From the primary point of view, there is no interference and the
signal-to-noise plus interference ratio (SINR) coincides with the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR):
SNR(p1(g11)) =
g11p1(g11)
σ2
. (3)
When using the notation p1(g11) instead of p11(t) we implicitly
make appropriate ergodicity assumptions on g11. The main purpose
of this section is precisely to determine the optimal control function
p1(g11) in the sense of the long-term energy efficiency, which is de-
fined as follows:
u1(p1(g11)) = R1
∫ +∞
0
φ11(g11)
f(SNR(p1(g11)))
p1(g11)
dg11 (4)
where R1 is the transmission rate and f is an efficiency function
representing the packet success rate f : R+ → [0, 1]. The function
f is assumed to possess the following properties:
1. f is non-decreasing, C2 differentiable, f(0) = 0, lim
x→+∞
f(x) =
1 and there exists a unique inflection point x0 for f .
2. f ′ is non-negative, f ′(0) = lim
x→+∞
f ′(x) = 0. f ′ reaches its
maximum for x0.
3. f ′′ is non-negative over [0, x0], negative over [x0,+∞[.
f (2)(0) = 0, lim
x→+∞
f ′′(x) = 0−.
These properties are verified by the two typical efficiency functions
available in the literature:
fa(x) =
{
e−
a
x ∀x > 0
0 if x = 0 (5)
and
fM (x) =
(
1− e−x
)M
∀x ≥ 0. (6)
The function fa, a ≥ 0 has been introduced in [8][9] and corre-
sponds to the case where the efficiency function equals one minus the
outage probability. On the other hand, fM , M ∈ N∗, corresponds
to an empirical approximation of the packet success rate which was
already used in [4].
Compared to references [4][5][6], note that the user’s utility
is the average energy-efficiency and not the instantaneous energy-
efficiency. This allows one to take into account the following energy
constraint:
T
∫ +∞
0
φ11(g11)p1(g11)dg11 ≤ E1 (7)
where T is the time-slot duration and E1 is the available energy for
terminal 1. In order to find the optimal solution(s) for the power
control schemes, let us consider the Lagrangian Lu1 . It writes as:
Lu1 = R1
∫ +∞
0
φ11(g11)
f(SNR(p1(g11)))
p1(g11)
dg11
− λ(T
∫ +∞
0
φ11(g11)p1(g11)dg11 − E1).
(8)
It is ready to show that the optimal instantaneous signal-to-noise
ratio (3) has to be the solution of ∂Lu1
∂p1(g11)
= 0:
xf
′(x)− f(x) =
λTσ4
R1g211
x
2
. (9)
Solving the above equation amounts to finding the zeros of F (x) =
xf ′(x) − f(x) − λTσ
4
R1g
2
11
x2. We have that F is C1 differentiable,
F (0) = 0, lim
x→+∞
F (x) = −∞, and
F
′(x) = xf (2)(x)− 2
λTσ4
R1g211
x. (10)
Then, ∃ǫ, ∀x ∈]0, ǫ], F ′(x) < 0. Considering the sign of F ′, given
the particular form of f (2), two cases have to be considered.
• If ∀x, f ′′(x) ≤ 2 λTσ
4
R1g
2
11
, F ′ is negative or null and F is de-
creasing. Then 0 is the only zero for F .
• If ∃(x1, x2), x1 < x2 st f ′′(x1) = f ′′(x2) = λTσ
4
R1g
2
11
, and
F ′ non-negative over [x1, x2]. F decreases over [0, x1], in-
creases over [x1, x2] and decreases over [x2,+∞[. Then F
may have zero, one or two zeros different from 0.
If F has one zero, it is 0 and 0 is the maximum for Lu1 . If F has
two zeros: 0 and x′0, Lu1 is decreasing and 0 is the maximum for
Lu1 . If F has three zeros: 0, x′1 and x′2, Lu1 decreases over [0, x′1],
increases over [x′1, x′2] and decreases over [x′2,+∞[. The maximum
for Lu1 is then 0 or x2.
Assume SNR∗λE1 (g) is the greatest solution of equation (9).
Then an optimal power control scheme is given by:
p
∗
1(g11) =
σ2
g11
SNR∗λE1 (g11) (11)
with SNR∗λE1 (g11) ≥ 0. Since E1 is fixed, the methodology con-
sists in determining λE1 , then a solution of (9) is determined nu-
merically. Note that λE1 is in bits/Joule2. It can be interpreted as a
minimal number of bits to transmit for 1 Joule2. The higher λE1 is,
the better the channel should be to be used.
Remark (Capacity of fast fading channels). The proposed
analysis is reminiscent to the capacity determination of fast fad-
ing single-user channels [10]. Two important differences between
this and our analysis are worth being emphasized. First, mathe-
matically, the optimization problem under study is more general
than the one of [10]. Indeed, if one makes the particular choice
f(SNR(p1(g11))) = p1 log (1 + SNR(p1(g11))), the optimal SNR
is given by SNR∗(p1(g11)) = g11λE1σ2 − 1, which corresponds to a
water-filling solution (the SNR has to be non-negative). Second, the
physical interpretation of the average utility is different from the fast
fading case. In the fast fading case, the power control is updated at
the symbol rate whereas in our case, it is updated at the time-slot
frequency namely, 1
T
. Indeed, in power control problems, what is
updated is the average power over a block or time-slot and assuming
an average power constraint over several blocks or time-slots gen-
erally does not make sense. However, from an energy perspective
introducing an average constraint is relevant. This comment is a
kind of subtle and characterizes our approach.
3.2. Time-slot occupancy probability
As shown in the preceding section, time-slots are not used by the pri-
mary link when the solution SNR∗λE1 (g11) is negative. Therefore,
the probability that this event occurs corresponds to the probability
of having a free time-slot for the secondary link. It is thus relevant
to evaluate Pr[SNR∗λE1 (g11) ≤ 0]. At first glance, explicating this
probability does not seem to be trivial. However, one can see from
the preceding section that if max f ′′ ≤ 2 λTσ
4
R1g
2
11
, the function F has
no non-negative solutions except from 0, in which case there is no
power allocated to channel g11. Based on this observation, the fol-
lowing lower bound arises:
Pr
[
max f ′′ ≤ 2
λTσ4
R1g211
]
≤ Pr[SNR∗λE1 (g11) ≤ 0]. (12)
Many simulations have shown that this lower bound is reason-
ably tight, one of them is provided in the simulation section; what
matters in this paper is to show that the fraction of available time-
slots can be significant and the proposed lower bound ensures
to achieve at least the corresponding performance. To conclude
on this point, note that in the case where f(SNR(p1(g11))) =
p1 log (1 + SNR(p1(g11))), the probability of having a free time-
slot for the secondary link can be easily expressed and is given
by:
Pr
[
SNR∗λE1 (g11) ≤ 0
]
= 1− e
−
λE1
σ2
g11 (13)
where g11 = E(g11). A similar analysis has been made to design
a Shannon-rate efficient interference alignment technique for static
MIMO interference channels [11][12].
4. A STACKELBERG FORMULATION OF THE
NON-ORTHOGONAL CASE
We assume now that both transmitters are free to decide their power
control policy. However, there is still hierarchy in the system in the
sense that, for each time-slot, the primary transmitter has to choose
its power level in the first place and the secondary transmitter (as-
sumed to equipped with a cognitive radio) observes this level and
reacts to it. This framework is exactly the one of a Stackelberg game
since it is assumed that the primary transmitter (called the game
leader) knows it is observed by a rational player (the game follower).
The SINR for the first transmitter/receiver pair is:
SINR1(p1, p2) =
p1g11
σ2 + p2g21
:= γ1, (14)
where g21 is the channel gain between transmitter 2 and receiver 1.
For the second transmitter/receiver pair, the SINR is:
SINR2(p1, p2) =
p2g22
σ2 + p1g12
:= γ2, (15)
where g12 is the channel gain between transmitter 1 and receiver
2. Using this relation, we have the powers for transmitters 1 and 2
depending on the SINRs:
p1 =
σ2
g11
γ1 + γ1γ2
g21
g22
1− αγ1γ2
, and p2 =
σ2
g22
γ2 + γ1γ2
g12
g11
1− αγ1γ2
with α = g21g12
g11g22
.
(16)
A Stackelberg equilibrium is a vector (p∗1, p∗2) such that:
p
∗
1 = argmax
p1
u1(p1, p
∗
2(p1)), (17)
with
∀p1, p
∗
2(p1) = argmax
p2
u2(p1, p2). (18)
Note that the above expression implicitly assumes that the best-
response of the follower is a singleton, which is effectively the case
for the problem under study. In our Stackelberg game, the utility
u2 of the secondary transmitter/receiver pair depends on the power
control scheme p1 through the expression:
∀p1, u2(p1, p2) =
R2
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
φ12(g12)φ22(g22)
f( p2g22
σ2+p1g12
)
p2
dg12dg22,
(19)
with the energy constraint:
T
∫ +∞
0
φ22(g22)p2dg22 ≤ E2. (20)
In order to determine a Stackelberg equilibrium, we first have to ex-
press the best response of the follower that is, the best power control
scheme for the secondary transmitter/receiver pair, given the long
term power control scheme of the primary transmitter/receiver pair.
For a given p1(g12), the Lagrangian Lu2 of u2 is given by:
Lu2(p1, p2, λ2) =
R2
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0
φ12(g12)φ22(g22)
f( p2g22
σ2+p1g12
)
p2
dg12dg22
− λ2(T
∫ +∞
0
φ22(g22)p2dg22 − E2).
(21)
Proposition 1 (Optimal SINR for the secondary transmitter). The
secondary transmitter has to tune its power level such that its SINR
is the greatest zero of the following equation:
xf
′(x)− f(x) =
λ2T (σ
2 + p1g12)
2
R2g222
x
2
. (22)
The proof is ready and follows the single-user case analysis,
which is conducted in Sec. 3. The optimal power control scheme p∗2
of the secondary transmitter/receiver pair, depending on the power
control scheme p1 is given by:
p
∗
2(p1) =
σ2 + p1g12
g22
x2(p1), (23)
where x2(p1) is the greatest solution of (22).
Now, let us the consider the case of the primary transmitter.
Proposition 2 (Optimal SINR for the primary transmitter). The pri-
mary transmitter has to tune its power level such that its SINR is the
greatest zero of the following equation:
xf
′(x) [1 − αx2x−G(x)]− f(x) =
λ1Tσ
4
R1g
2
11
(
1 +
g21
g22
x2
1 − αxx2
)2
x
2
,
with G(x) =
αx(1 +
g12
g11
x)2x2
(1 − αx2x)2
R2g
2
22
2λ2Tσ
4
f ′′(x2) − (1 +
g12
g11
x)2
.
(24)
Proof. The leader is optimizing his utility function u1 taking into ac-
count this best response power control scheme of the follower trans-
mitter/receiver pair. The SINR of the leader transmitter/receiver pair,
when the follower transmitter/receiver pair uses his best response
power control scheme, is given by:
SINR1(p1, p
∗
2(p1)) =
p1g11
σ2 + p∗2(p1)g21
=
p1g11
σ2(1 + g21
g22
x2(p1)) + p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p1)
.
(25)
The derivative of the SINR of the leader is
∂γ1
∂p1
(p1) =
g11
σ2(1 + g21
g22
x2(p1))− p1σ
2 g21
g22
x′2(p1)− p
2
1
g12g21
g22
x′2(p1)
(σ2(1 + g21
g22
x2(p1)) + p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p1))2
(26)
Then we have
p1
∂γ1
∂p1
(p1) =
γ1(p1)
σ2(1 +
g21
g22
x2(p1)) − p1σ
2 g21
g22
x′
2
(p1) − p
2
1
g12g21
g22
x′
2
(p1)
σ2(1 +
g21
g22
x2(p1)) + p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p1)
,
= γ1(p1)
(
1 −
p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p1) + p1σ
2 g21
g22
x′
2
(p1) + p
2
1
g12g21
g22
x′
2
(p1)
σ2(1 +
g21
g22
x2(p1)) + p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p1)
)
,
= γ1(p1)
(
1 − x2(p1)αγ1(p1) −
(σ2 + p1g12)p1
g21
g22
x′
2
(p1)
σ2(1 +
g21
g22
x2(p1)) + p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p1)
)
,
= γ1(p1)
(
1 − x2(p1)αγ1(p1) −
σ2 + p1g12
g12
αx
′
2
(p1)γ1(p1)
)
(27)
Taking the expression of x2(p1) we get:
x
′
2f
′(x2) + x2x
′
2f
′′(x2)− x
′
2f
′(x2) =
2
λ2T (σ
2 + p1g12)
R2g222
g12x
2
2 + 2
λ2T (σ
2 + p1g12)
2
R2g222
x2x
′
2,
(28)
which yields to:
x
′
2f
′′(x2) = 2
λ2T (σ
2 + p1g12)
R2g222
g12x2 + 2
λ2T (σ
2 + p1g12)
2
R2g222
x
′
2.
(29)
Then we get the derivative of x2(p1):
x
′
2(p1) =
2λ2T
R2g
2
22
(σ2 + p1g12)g12x2
f ′′(x2)−
2λ2T
R2g
2
22
(σ2 + p1g12)2
. (30)
Then we have:
(σ2 + p1g12)x
′
2(p1)
g12
=
2λ2T
R2g
2
22
(σ2 + p1g12)
2x2
f ′′(x2)−
2λ2T
R2g
2
22
(σ2 + p1g12)2
. (31)
Taking the expression of the power of receiver/transmitter pair 1 de-
pending on both SINRs, we get:
σ
2 + p1g12 = σ
2
(
1 + g12
g11
γ1
1− αγ1γ2
)
, (32)
Then
(σ2 + p1g12)x
′
2(p1)
g12
=
(1 + g12
g11
γ1)
2x2
(1− αγ2γ1)2
R2g
2
22
2λ2Tσ4
f ′′(x2)− (1 +
g12
g11
γ1)2
.
(33)
Then we have:
p1
∂γ1
∂p1
(p1) =
γ1

1− αx2γ1 − αγ1(1 + g12g11 γ1)2x2
(1− αx2γ1)2
Rg2
22
2λ2Tσ4
f ′′(x2)− (1 +
g12
g11
γ1)2


(34)
By denoting x1 the largest solution of this equation, the optimal
power control scheme of the leader at the equilibrium is given by:
p∗1g11
σ2(1 + g21
g22
x2(p∗1)) + p1
g12g21
g22
x2(p∗1)
= x1. (35)
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The following simulations are performed with the parameters: T =
10−3 s, R1 = R2 = 10
4 bits/s, σ2 = 10−12 W, the channel gains
g11 and g22 are assumed to follow a Rayleigh distribution of mean
10−10, when needed, g12 and g21 are assumed to follow a Rayleigh
distribution of mean 10−12 and the efficiency function used is fa,
defined in Sec. 3 with a = 0.9. Fig. 1 illustrates the influence of
λE on the energy constraint in a single-user case. When λE is low,
the optimal power control scheme is to transmit most of the time,
thus the energy spent is high. On the contrary, when λE increases,
transmission will only occurs when the channel gain is good enough,
resulting in a lower energy spent. After a certain threshold, the opti-
mal scheme is not to transmit at all.
102 104 106 108 1010 1012 1014
10−12
10−10
10−8
10−6
10−4
λ (bits/J²)
E 
(J)
Fig. 1. Energy spent on duration T depending on λE .
In Fig. 2, we are in the context of Sec. 3.2. We compute the
probability per time-slot that the primary link is not used and we
compare it to its lower bound. It is interesting to note that this lower-
bound is relatively tight to the exact probability.
Fig. 3 compares the expected utilities of Stackelberg equilibrium
(Sec. 4) and the orthogonal case (Sec. 3). As we could expect, the
primary link of the orthogonal case offers the best utility, but the
orthogonal secondary link has the worst performance. The leader
and follower of the Stackelberg case have are much more similar in
terms of performance and are very clos to the performance of the
primary link which makes the Stackelberg case a very efficient and
fair scenario for both links. Of course, like in the single-user case,
after a threshold for λ, they do not transmit at all.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the exact probability of having free time-slot
with the proposed lower bound of this probability.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the expected utilities of Stackelberg equilib-
rium and the orthogonal case depending on λ. In this particular case,
λ1 = λ2 = λ.
In particular, Fig. 4 shows the optimal power profile of the lead-
ing transmitter w.r.t. the channels gains g11 and g22 when λ = 1010
bits/J2. It is clear that for low values of g11, the optimal policy is not
to transmit. Then we distinguish two zones of interest:
• when both g11 and g22 are good, the transmitter uses most of
its power for a relatively high value of g11,
• when only g11 is good, we can see that the transmitter uses
most of its power for a lower value of g11 as it is not likely
to facing interference from the following transmitter in this
zone.
6. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, it is shown how a long-term energy constraint modifies
the behavior of a transmitter in terms of power control policy. In
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Fig. 4. Power profile of the leading transmitter w.r.t. g11 and g22 in
the two-player Stackelberg case.
contrast with related works such as [4][5][6], a transmitter does not
always transmit when it is subject to such a constraint. This shows
that when implementing its best power control policy, a primary link
does not exploit all the available time-slots. The probability of hav-
ing a free time-slot for the secondary link can be lower bounded in a
reasonably tight manner and shown to be non-negligible in general.
As a second step, a scenario where the secondary link can inter-
fere on the primary link is analyzed. The problem is formulated as a
Stackelberg game where the primary transmitter is the leader and the
secondary transmitter is the follower. An equilibrium in this game is
shown to exist for typical conditions on the efficiency function f(x).
Interestingly, the fact that the transmitters have a long-term energy
constraint can make the system more efficient since this incites users
to interfere less; indeed simulations show the existence of a value
of an energy budget which maximizes the users’s utilities. While
the power control schemes at the equilibrium can be determined,
the corresponding equations have a drawback: the power control
scheme of a given user does not only rely on the knowledge of its
individual channel gain but also on the other channel gains. This
shows the relevance of improving the proposed work by designing
more distributed power control policies. Additionally, the proposed
scenarios included one primary link and one secondary link. When
several cognitive transmitters are present, there is a competition be-
tween the secondary transmitters for exploiting the resources left by
the primary link.
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